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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from final Orders issued by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission that 
denied approval of two Power Purchase Agreements ("PP As" or "Agreements") between Idaho 
Power Company and Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind Park II (collectively 
"Grouse Creek" or "Projects"). The underlying administrative proceeding was initiated when 
Idaho Power filed separate applications requesting that the Commission accept or reject two 
PP As between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek entered into pursuant to the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURP A"). In June 2011, the Commission disapproved the 
two PP As because the published "avoided cost" rates contained in the PP As were no longer 
available to the Projects. 
B. PURP A and the Context of this Case 
Congress enacted the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act in 1978 (PURPA) in 
response to a national energy crisis. Its purpose was to lessen the country's dependence on 
foreign oil and to encourage the promotion and development of renewable energy technologies 
as alternatives to fossil fuels. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) v. Mississippi, 
456 U.S. 742, 745-46, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 2129 (1982. PURPA requires that electric utilities (such 
as Idaho Power) purchase the power produced by eligible "qualifying facilities" (QFs). This 
mandatory purchase requirement is often referred to as the "must purchase" provision of 
PURPA. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(b); 18 C.F.R. § 292.303(a); Rat 260. 
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Under the must purchase prov1s1on, the rate at which a utility must buy the power 
produced by a QF is generally referred to as the "avoided cost rate." The avoided cost rate 
represents "the incremental costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both 
which, but for the purchase from the [QF], such utility would generate itself or purchase from 
another source." Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud II), 128 Idaho 624, 632, 917 P.2d 
781, 789 (1996); 18 C.F.R. § 292.101(b)(6). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that the 
Commission has the authority under PURP A and the implementing regulations of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) "to set 'avoided costs,' to order electric utilities to 
purchase power from small power producers, and to implement FERC rules." Rosebud 
Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud I), 128 Idaho 609, 613, 917 P.2d 766, 770 (1996); A.W 
Brown v. Idaho Power Co., 121 Idaho 812, 814, 828 P.2d 841, 843 (1992). 
C. The Course of Proceedings 
On December 29, 2010, Idaho Power filed two separate applications each requesting 
acceptance or rejection of a 20-year Agreement between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek (the 
Projects). On February 24, 2011, the Commission issued a consolidated Notice of Application 
and Notice of Modified Procedure1 requesting public comment on the consolidated applications. 
R. at 140. The Notice set a March 24, 2011, deadline for comments and a March 31, 2011, 
deadline for reply comments. Comments were filed by Commission Staff and Grouse Creek. R. 
at 146, 158. Idaho Power filed reply comments. R. at 185. 
1 The parties in the two cases filed consolidated comments because the relevant facts for each project are 
substantially similar. Consequently, the Commission consolidated the cases and issued consolidated notices and 
orders. !PUC Rule 247, IDAPA 31.01.01.247. R. at 221. 
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On April 7, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Set Time for Oral Argument because 
"the records in these cases are lengthy and Idaho Power appears to interpret the evidence 
different than the Grouse Creek QFs .... " R. at 204. Commission Staff and Idaho Power filed 
objections to the Projects' Motion. On April 27, 2011, the Commission issued an Order denying 
the Projects' Motion. The Commission found that "the [written] evidentiary record sufficiently 
reflects the positions of all parties. Moreover, the Projects have not alleged that their position is 
not adequately presented through written submissions." R. at 219. 
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued its final Order No. 32257 disapproving the 
Agreements because, on the effective date of the Agreements, the projects ( 10 average 
megawatts (aMW)) exceeded the eligibility cap (100 kilowatts (kW)) for published avoided cost 
rates. R. at 230. The Commission found that the express effective date of each Agreement 
occurred after the Commission had lowered eligibility for published avoided cost rates to 100 
kW for wind and solar projects. R. at 229. On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek timely filed for 
reconsideration of the Commission's Order pursuant to Idaho Code § 61-626. R. at 233. Idaho 
Power filed an answer to Grouse Creek's petition. R. at 242. 
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued its final reconsideration Order No. 32299 
affirming its initial decision to disapprove the two Agreements. R. at 265. The Commission 
found that the Projects were not eligible for the avoided cost rates contained in the Agreements. 
Specifically, the Commission found that "[b]ecause the size of each of these wind projects 
exceeds 100 kW, they are not eligible to receive the published avoided cost rate." R. at 265. 
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 3 
On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek timely appealed the Commission's final Order Nos. 
32257 and 32299 to this Court. R. at 268. While the appeal was pending, the parties observed 
that FERC had recently issued a Declaratory Order in what appeared to be a similarly situated 
Idaho case ("the Cedar Creek Case") where the Commission also disapproved Cedar Creek's 
PURPA agreements. On November 3, 2011, the parties (Grouse Creek, the Commission and 
Idaho Power) filed a Stipulated Motion with this Court to suspend the appeal and remand the 
matter to the PUC so that the parties and Commission could consider the Grouse Creek Orders in 
light of FERC's Cedar Creek decision, and also see if the appeal could be settled. R. at 285. 
The Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011. 
On December 9 and December 22, 2011, Grouse Creek, Idaho Power and Commission 
Staff met to discuss settlement of the issues. Because settlement discussions were unfruitful, the 
Commission issued Order No. 32430 directing the parties to file legal briefs and setting oral 
argument. R. at 292. On February 6, 2012, briefs were filed by Commission Staff and Idaho 
Power. Grouse Creek filed a reply brief on February 27, 2012. Oral argument was convened on 
March 7, 2012. 
On September 7, 2012, the Commission issued its final remand Order No. 32635 again 
disapproving the Grouse Creek Agreements because the avoided cost rates in the Agreements 
"were no longer available at the time the Agreements were executed and became effective." R. 
at 362. The Commission found that the Agreements contained explicit provisions regarding: (1) 
when the Agreements became effective; and (2) integration or merger of any and all 
contemporaneous agreements. R. at 356, 359. The Commission observed that the stated 
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effective date of December 28, 2010 (R. at 23, 25 § 1.11) was after the Commission reduced 
eligibility to published rates to 100 kW on December 14, 2010. R. at 229-30; 255-56; 258; 265; 
355-62. The Commission also found that the integration/merger clause operated "as an 
acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements supersede all prior oral 
or written agreements between the parties." R. at 359. On October 19, 2012, Grouse Creek filed 
an Amended Notice of Appeal. 
The proposed record was served on all parties on November 20, 2012. On December 18, 
2012, Commission Staff and Idaho Power filed timely objections to the proposed record and 
requested a hearing pursuant to Appellate Rules 29(a) and 13(e). R. at 377, 385. The 
Commission issued a notice setting the matter for hearing on January 9, 2013. R. at 390. 
Following the hearing, the Commission issued Order No. 32720 granting Idaho Power's and 
Commission Staffs objections to the record. R. at 396. Thereafter, the Commission filed the 
Agency's Record on Appeal with the Court pursuant to Appellate Rule 29. 
On February 1, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Expedite oral argument with the 
Court pursuant to Appellate Rule 32( c). Idaho Power filed a response opposing Grouse Creek's 
Motion. While the Commission did not oppose the Projects' request for expedited oral 
argument, the PUC objected to Grouse Creek's stated need for expedited review. On February 
20, 2013, the Court granted Grouse Creek's Motion to Expedite Oral Argument and set the 
matter to be heard during the August 2013 Term. Ref. No. 13-92. 
On February 12, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Augment the Appellate Record 
with the Court. The Projects' requested that an Affidavit of former counsel Gregory Adams and 
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two unserved "complaints" previously excluded by the Commission be included in the record on 
appeal. The Commission and Idaho Power opposed inclusion of the requested material. The 
Commission argued in the alternative that, if the Court granted Grouse Creek's Motion to 
Augment, the Court also include two additional documents. On March 8, 2013, the Court 
granted Grouse Creek's Motion to Augment and also granted the Commission's Motion in the 
alternative to augment the record on appeal. Ref. No. 13-118. 
On March 22, 2013, Grouse Creek filed a Motion to Augment its initial brief with an 
additional argument. It included a Supplemental Brief with its Motion. On April 1, 2013, the 
Commission filed an Uncontested Motion to Extend the Filing of the Respondents' briefs. The 
parties agree that the Commission and Idaho Power should have three additional days and file 
their briefs no later than April 5, 2013. The Court granted the extension. 
D. Concise Statement of the Facts 
Under PURPA and rules implemented by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), the Commission must establish and publish standard avoided cost rates for small QFs 
with a design capacity of 100 kW or less. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(c). However, FERC rules grant 
the Commission discretion to increase or raise design capacity (commonly referred to as the 
"eligibility cap") for access to published rates. For most of calendar year 20 I 0 the eligibility cap 
for the published rates was set by the Commission at I 0 average megawatts (aMW). 
In Idaho, published avoided cost rates are calculated based on a surrogate (natural gas-
fired) avoided resource (SAR). A voided cost rates for larger projects (i.e., above the eligibility 
cap) are calculated using what is referred to as the "Integrated Resource Planning" (IRP) 
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Methodology. The purpose of utilizing the IRP Methodology for large QF projects is to more 
precisely value the energy being delivered. The IRP Methodology recognizes that larger projects 
have a greater effect on a utility's ability to balance its total load and resources. R. at 222. 
1. Reducing the Eligibility Cap to 100 kW 
On November 5, 2010 (prior to the date that Idaho Power filed the executed Grouse 
Creek PP As with the Commission), Idaho Power, A vista Corporation and PacifiCorp dba Rocky 
Mountain Power filed a joint petition requesting that the Commission initiate an investigation to 
address various avoided cost issues related to the Commission's implementation of PURP A 
(GNR-E-10-04). The utilities requested that, while the Commission pursued its investigation, 
the published avoided cost rate "eligibility cap" be reduced from 10 aMW to 100 kW, effective 
immediately. R. at 222, 254. 
In response to the utilities' filing, on November 8, 2010, the Grouse Creek projects each 
filed a complaint against Idaho Power alleging failure to negotiate in good faith. Augmented 
Record. However, Grouse Creek requested on November 19, 2010, that the Commission not 
issue a summons to Idaho Power regarding the complaints because Grouse Creek and Idaho 
Power had "tentatively reached a settlement. ... " App. B. No further action on the complaints 
was ever requested by Grouse Creek. 
On December 3, 2010, the Commission issued Order No. 32131 declining the utilities' 
motion to immediately reduce the published avoided cost rate eligibility cap. However, the 
Order notified parties that the Commission's decision regarding the motion to reduce the 
published avoided cost eligibility cap would become effective on December 14, 2010. Based 
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upon the record in the GNR-E-10-04 case, the Commission subsequently found that a 
"convincing case has been made to temporarily reduce the eligibility cap for published avoided 
cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar only while the Commission further 
investigates" other avoided cost issues. R. at 223 (emphasis in original). The Commission's 
stated goal was to allow small QFs access to published avoided cost rates "without allowing 
large QFs to obtain a rate that is not an accurate reflection of a utility's avoided cost for such 
projects." Commission Order No. 32176 at 11. 
On reconsideration, the Commission affirmed its decision in Order No. 32176 to 
temporarily reduce the eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates from 10 aMW to 100 kW. 
R. at 223; 2011 WL 1210463 (IPUC). No party, including Grouse Creek, appealed the 
Commission's decision to reduce the eligibility cap. R. at 255, 263. Thus, the eligibility cap for 
published avoided cost rates for wind and solar QF projects was set at 100 kW effective 
December 14, 2010. 
2. The Grouse Creek Project(s) 
The Grouse Creek projects initially started out as a single project with a design capacity 
of up to 65 MW. R. at 3 51. Because this project size exceeded the eligibility cap for published 
avoided cost rates, Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with proposed pricing for its large 
project using the IRP Methodology. R. at 191. In June 2010, Grouse Creek abandoned its 
original design for a single large project and, instead, requested published avoided cost rates for 
two I 0 aMW projects near Lynn, Utah. R. at 351. Ongoing communications continued between 
the parties. 
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On November 1, 2010, Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with two published avoided 
cost rate PURPA contracts. R. at 352. On December 2, 2010, Grouse Creek returned to Idaho 
Power edited versions of the draft agreements previously provided by the utility. Appellant's 
Brief at 13. On December 9, 2010, Grouse Creek requested that the First Energy Date and the 
Commercial Online Date in the Agreements be modified. R. at 352. On December 15, 2010, 
Idaho Power requested that Grouse Creek confirm its first energy and commercial operation 
dates to be contained in the Agreements. R. at 193. Grouse Creek confirmed the dates on 
December 16, 2010. Id. Idaho Power provided Grouse Creek with executable agreements on 
December 16, 2010. Appellant's Brief at 13. The Projects returned signed Agreements to Idaho 
Power on December 21, 2010. R. at 354. Idaho Power reviewed and signed the Agreements on 
December 28, 2010. On December 29, 2010, Idaho Power filed the Agreements with the 
Commission for a determination of whether to approve or disapprove the underlying 
Agreements. R. at 354. 
Under the terms of the PP As, each wind project agreed to sell electric energy to Idaho 
Power for a 20-year term using IO aMW non-levelized published avoided cost rates.2 By its own 
terms, the "Effective Date" for each PPA is "[t]he date stated in the opening paragraph of this 
Firm Energy Sales Agreement representing the date upon which this Firm Energy Sales 
Agreement was fully executed by both Parties." R. at 25, 90. The opening paragraph of each 
Agreement reflects that it was "entered into" on December 28, 2010. R. at 23 (PP A at p. I). 
Each Agreement further states that it will not become effective until the Commission has 
2 The nameplate rating of each project is 21 MW. Under normal and/or average conditions, each wind QF would 
not sell more than 10 aMW on a monthly basis to Idaho Power. 
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approved all of the terms and conditions and declares that all payments made by Idaho Power to 
Grouse Creek for purchases of energy will be allowed as prudently incurred expenses for 
ratemaking purposes. R. at 52 (Agreements at~ 21.1). Section 29.1 of each Agreement is the 
merger or integration clause and states that "[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement of 
the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral 
or written agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter hereo[" (Emphasis 
added.) 
In its comments, Grouse Creek urged the Commission to approve the terms of the 
Agreements. R. at 181. Commission Staff recommended that the Commission disapprove the 
Agreements because, based on the effective date of the Agreements, the Projects were not 
entitled to the published avoided cost rates contained within each contract. R. at 150. 
3. The Commission's Initial Decision (Order No. 32257) 
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued final Order No. 32257 disapproving the two 
Agreements. The Commission found that Grouse Creek signed each Agreement on December 
20, 2010, and Idaho Power signed on December 28, 2010. R. at 226 n.3, 229. The Commission 
also noted that the Agreements contain language regarding the effective date. Section 1.11 of the 
Agreements unequivocally states that the "Effective Date" of the Agreements is "The date stated 
in the opening paragraph of this . . . Agreement representing the date upon which this 
[Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties." R. at 25, 90 (Agreements at~ 1.11). The 
opening paragraph of each Agreement is dated December 28, 2010. R. at 23, 88. 
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Based upon the express terms of the signed Agreements, the Commission determined that 
the Agreements were not fully executed (signed by both parties) prior to December 14, 2010, the 
date upon which the eligibility for published avoided cost rates changed from 10 aMW to 100 
kW for wind and solar projects. R. at 229-30. Consequently, the Commission found that the 
rates contained in the Agreements were no longer available because each of the Projects 
requested published avoided cost rates and each QF was larger than 100 kW. R. at 230. 
The Commission stated that "[t]he Commission does not consider a utility and its 
ratepayers obligated until both parties have completed their final reviews and signed the 
agreement." R. at 229. The Commission observed that "a thorough review is appropriate and 
necessary prior to signing Agreements that obligate ratepayers to payments in excess of $230 
million" over the 20-year term of the Agreements. Id. The Commission found that for a wind or 
solar QF larger than 100 kW to be eligible for published avoided cost rates, the Power Purchase 
Agreement must have been executed, i.e., signed by both parties, prior to the December 14, 
2010, effective date of the change in eligibility criteria. R. at 230. The Commission concluded 
that it was "not in the public interest to allow parties with contracts executed on or after 
December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of an eligibility cap that is no longer applicable." Id. 
4. Reconsideration (Order No. 32299) 
On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration of the 
Commission's final Order No. 32257. R. at 233. Grouse Creek argued that, pursuant to 18 
C.F.R. § 292.304(d)(2)(ii), a QF is entitled to the rates that are in effect on the date the QF 
incurred a "legally enforceable obligation" to provide energy. The Projects maintained that the 
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"obligation to purchase a QF' s output is created by the QF committing itself to sell to an electric 
utility, which also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF." R. at 236. Based on this 
premise, Grouse Creek argued that the Commission's final Order was not in conformity with 
controlling federal law because it allegedly requires a utility's signature to establish a legally 
enforceable obligation. 
On July 6, 2011, Idaho Power filed an answer to the Petition for Reconsideration. R. at 
242. Idaho Power maintained that the Commission's final Order is based on substantial and 
competent evidence. The utility asserted that it was not in the public interest to allow parties 
with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of a published rate 
that is no longer applicable. R. at 247 citing Order No. 32257 at 9. Idaho Power asserted that 
the Commission was acting within its discretion and, therefore, reconsideration should be denied. 
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Order No. 32299 denying the Projects' Petition 
for Reconsideration. R. at 252. The Commission found that the parties voluntarily entered into a 
legally enforceable obligation at the time the parties executed their Agreements. R. at 258. By 
their very terms, the Agreements were not effective until December 28, 2010. Id. citing PPA at~ 
1.11. The Commission explained that "FERC regulations grant the states latitude in 
implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." R. at 258 
citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). The Commission found that, in determining 
when the parties incurred a legally enforceable obligation, the Commission properly exercised 
the authority granted it by FERC. Thus, on the effective date of the Agreements, the Projects 
were not entitled to published avoided cost rates. R. at 265. 
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The Commission further explained that nothing cited by Grouse Creek demonstrated that 
the Commission's Order was inconsistent with federal law. The Commission observed that 
FERC specifically delegated authority to the state commissions to determine when and how a 
legally enforceable obligation is created. R. at 258. The Commission also determined that its 
decision was in the public interest and strikes a balance between "the local public interest of a 
utility's electric consumers and the national public interest in development of alternative energy 
sources." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 613, 917 P.2d at 770. R. at 259. On September 7, 2011, 
Grouse Creek timely appealed the Commission's final Order Nos. 32257 and 32299. R. at 269. 
5. Remand to the PUC 
After Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to this Court, FERC issued a 
Declaratory Order addressing the Commission's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PPAs. 
FERC opined that the Commission's decision in Cedar Creek was inconsistent with PURPA and 
FERC's regulations implementing PURPA. Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC ir 61,006 (October 4, 
2011). FERC construed the Commission's final Order in the Cedar Creek case as "limiting the 
creation of a legally enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PP As] ... signed by both 
parties to the agreement." Id at ~ 26. FERC incorrectly interpreted that the Commission's 
Cedar Creek Order required a fully-executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of 
a legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Id. at~~ 30, 35. FERC concluded that the 
Commission did not recognize that "a legally enforceable obligation may be incurred before the 
formal memorialization of a contract to writing." Id. at~ 36. 
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On November 3, 2011, in response to FERC's Order, Grouse Creek, the Commission and 
Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion to suspend the appeal and remand the matter to the 
Commission for further consideration and to see if the parties could settle their dispute. The 
Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011. On remand, the parties participated in 
settlement negotiations which were ultimately unsuccessful. Consequently, the Commission 
directed the parties to file legal briefs and scheduled an oral argument for March 7, 2012. R. at 
294. 
Grouse Creek argued that all material terms to the Agreements with Idaho Power were 
well settled prior to December 14, 2010, despite the express effective date of December 28, 
2010, in each Agreement. R. at 352. Consequently, Grouse Creek alleged that a legally 
enforceable obligation was formed before it executed the Agreements. Thus, Grouse Creek 
claimed entitlement to the higher published avoided cost rates contained in its Agreements. R. at 
352. 
Commission Staff recognized that the Commission's prior Orders relied on the express 
terms of the Agreements between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. R. at 352. Relying on its 
reading of PURP A and FERC's Cedar Creek Order, Commission Staff opined that a legally 
enforceable obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 2010 - the date upon which the 
Projects requested a change in their on-line dates in the Agreements. R. at 353. 
For its part, Idaho Power argued that it pursued good faith negotiations with Grouse 
Creek and that any delay in executing the Agreements is not attributable to a refusal by Idaho 
Power to negotiate or execute a contract. Id. Idaho Power further asserted that the facts of this 
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case are different than the Cedar Creek Case. The utility argued that, because Idaho Power did 
not refuse to enter into a contract with Grouse Creek, the Projects' legally enforceable obligation 
is incurred on the date that they signed the Agreements and obligated themselves to sell energy 
to Idaho Power. Therefore, Idaho Power concluded that Grouse Creek is not eligible for 
published rate contracts. R. at 354. 
6. Order on Remand (Order No. 32635) 
On September 7, 2012, the Commission issued its Order on Remand again denying 
approval of Grouse Creek's two Agreements. R. at 346. The Commission explained that it is up 
to the States, not FERC, "to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase 
agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is incurred under State 
law." R. at 354 citing West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC ~ 61,153 at 61,495 (1995). The 
Commission further held that "[t]he exercise of a State commission's discretion in the 
application of PURP A standards to particular contracts has long been recognized as outside the 
scope of FERC's enforcement authority." R. at 355 citing Policy Statement Regarding the 
Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act 
of 1978, 23 FERC ~ 61,304 at 61,645 (1983). 
The Commission clarified that, despite FERC' s statements to the contrary in Cedar 
Creek, "this Commission did not and has never made a determination that the creation of a 
legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed 
agreement." R. at 355 (emphasis in original). The Commission found that "the Agreements 
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were negotiated, agreed to and executed by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that 
the effective date of the PPAs is December 28, 2010." R. at 356. 
We clearly did not make a finding that the creation of a legally enforceable 
obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed 
agreement. We found, based on the specific facts of the two Grouse Creek 
projects that the parties entered into Agreements that unequivocally state an 
effective date. We are simply recognizing the express terms of the executed 
Agreements. 
R. at 356. Because the size of each Grouse Creek project exceeds 100 kW and each Agreement 
became effective after December 14, 2010, the Commission found that the Projects were not 
eligible for published avoided cost rates. 
The Commission also observed that the Agreements contain an integration or merger 
clause. Section 29.1 of each Agreement states that "[t]his Agreement constitutes the entire 
Agreement of the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or 
contemporaneous oral or written agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter 
hereof." R. at 54, 119 (emphasis added.) The Commission found that this integration or merger 
clause operated "as an acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements 
supersede all prior oral or \\<Titten agreements between the parties." R. at 359 citing Thomas v. 
Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644-645, 249 P.3d 829, 837-838 (2011); Silver Syndicate v. Sunshine 
J\1ining Co., 101Idaho226, 235, 611P.2d1011, 1020 (1979). 
Relying on federal Court of Appeals cases, the Commission further observed that 
FERC's declaratory orders are not binding on the Idaho PUC. R.. at 356.3 A declaratory order 
3 "A declaratory order 'that does no more than announce the [FERC's] interpretation of the PURPA or one of the 
agency's implementation regulations is of no legal moment unless and until a district court adopts that interpretation 
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issued by FERC "is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to persuade (or to command the 
deference of) a [district] court that might later have been called upon to interpret the Act and the 
agency's regulations in an [sic] private enforcement action .... " R. at 357 quoting Industrial 
Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Therefore, any reliance by the 
parties on FERC's Cedar Creek and subsequent declaratory orders is misplaced. Id 
After considering FERC's regulations and applicable case law, the Commission 
determined that 
Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF can obtain an avoided 
cost rate is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC. 
Either the parties enter into a contract or, if the utility is failing to negotiate or 
refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file a complaint with this 
Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination as to 
whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose. In this case, the parties 
negotiated and executed two Agreements. . . . A determination regarding whether 
and when a legally enforceable obligation arose - outside the specific contract 
terms - was wholly unnecessary. The Agreements submitted to the Commission 
for approval included all of the terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by 
the parties - including the effective date of the Agreements. 
R. at 358. Consequently, the Commission affirmed its prior Orders that, because each 
Agreement became effective on December 28, 2010, and each project is larger than 100 kW, 
published avoided cost rates are not available to the Projects. R. at 362. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The IPUC contends the issues on appeal listed in Grouse Creek's brief are insufficient 
and incomplete, and so will state the issues consistent with l.A.R. 35, as follows: 
when called upon to enforce the PURP A."' R. at 356 quoting Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 117 F.3d 
1485, 1488, (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
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1. The Commission properly held that the Agreements were not effective until 
December 28, 2010. 
2. Grandfathering the avoided cost rates in the Agreements would contradict the 
underlying rationale for the Commission's decision in changing the eligibility to published rates. 
3. The Commission is not preventing Grouse Creek from obtaining a PURPA 
Agreement. 
4. Declaratory orders issued by FERC are not binding on the Commission or this Court. 
5. Grouse Creek did not pursue its complaints. 
6. Grouse Creek is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
The standard of review on appeal from final Orders of the Commission are well 
settled. "The review on appeal shall not be extended further than to determine whether the 
commission has regularly pursued its authority, including a determination of whether the order 
appealed from violates any right of the appellant under the constitution of the United States or 
the state ofldaho." Idaho Code§ 61-629; Idaho Const. Art. V, § 9. 
With regard to findings of fact, if the Commission's findings are supported by 
substantial, competent evidence this Court must affirm those findings, Industrial Customers of 
Idaho Power v. Idaho PUC, 134 Idaho 285, 288, 1 P.3d 786, 789 (2000); Idaho Power Co. v. 
Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 151Idaho266, 272, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011), even if the 
Court would have made a different choice had the matter been before it de nova. Hulet v. Idaho 
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PUC, 138 Idaho 476, 478, 65 P.3d 498, 500 (2003). "Thus, the IPUC's findings of fact must be 
affirmed unless it appears that the clear weight of the evidence is against the conclusion, or that 
the evidence is strong and persuasive that the IPUC has abused its discretion." Rosebud I, 128 
Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. 
The "Commission as the finder of fact, need not weigh and balance the evidence 
presented to it, but is free to accept certain evidence and disregard other evidence." Industrial 
Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794; PacifiCorp v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 153 
Idaho 759, 767, 291 P.3d 442, 450 (2012). "The commission is free to rely on its own expertise 
as justification for its decision." Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794. Simply 
put, the findings of the Commission must be reasonable "when viewed in the light that the record 
in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the [Commission's] view." 
Hayden Pines Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, 111 Idaho 331, 336, 723 P.2d 875, 880 (1986). 
The Commission's Orders must present sufficient findings and contain the reasoning 
behind its conclusions to sufficiently allow the Court to determine that the Commission did not 
act arbitrarily. Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775. The Commission's findings need 
not take any particular form so long as they fairly disclose the basic facts upon which the 
Commission relies and support its decisions. Id. at 624, 917 P .2d at 781. "The burden is on the 
party challenging the Commission's findings to show that they are unsupported by the evidence." 
In re Ryder, 141 Idaho 918, 924, 120 P.3d 736, 742 (2005) quoting Hulet, 138 Idaho at 478, 65 
P.3d at 500. 
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On questions of law, review is limited to the determination of whether the 
Commission has regularly pursued its authority. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 815, 828 P .2d at 844; 
Hulet, 138 Idaho at 478, 65 P.3d at 500. On appeal, the Commission's Order or ruling will not 
be set aside unless it has failed to follow the law or has abused its discretion. Application of 
Boise Water Corp., 82 Idaho 81, 86, 349 P.2d 711, 713 (1960). An unambiguous contract must 
be "construed in its plain, ordinary and proper sense, according with the meaning derived from 
the plain wording of the contract. City of lvferidian v. Petra Inc.,_ Idaho_, Slip Op. No. 43 
at 6 (April 1, 2013); Potlatch Educ. Ass'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 
226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). The "language of the agreement [is] 'the best indication of the 
parties' intent."' City of Meridian, Slip Op. at 9; Struab v. Smith, 145 Idaho 65, 69, 175 P.3d 
754, 758 (2007). If a written contract contains a merger or integration clause, then it is complete 
upon its face. Howardv. Perry, 141Idaho139, 142, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005). 
B. The Commission Properly Held that the Agreements were not Effective until December 
28, 2010 
I. Idaho Regulatory Framework 
Grouse Creek argues that the Commission's Orders are contrary to PURP A and FERC 
regulations because nothing in the FERC regulations "requires the filing of a complaint and/or 
the culmination of complaint proceedings, in order to establish the date of a legally enforceable 
obligation, or that remotely stands for the proposition that if a QF elects to negotiate and 
executes a contract, a legally enforceable obligation cannot be created prior to contract 
finalization and execution." Appellant's Brief at 25. 
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Grouse Creek's argument is misdirected, ignores FERC's delegation of such duties to the 
States, and is contrary to federal regulations. It is well settled that 
It is up to the States, not FERC, to determine the specific parameters of individual 
QF power purchase agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable 
obligation is incurred under State law. Similarly, whether the particular facts 
applicable to an individual QF necessitate modifications of other terms and 
conditions of the QF's contract with the purchasing utility is a matter for the 
States to determine. 
R. at 354-55, 356 (emphasis added) citing Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 781; West 
Penn Power Co., 71 FERC ii 61,153 at 61,495 (1995); accord: Jersey Central Power & Light 
Co., 73 FERC ii 61,092 at 61,297-61,298 (1995); Metropolitan Edison Co. and Pennsylvania 
Electric Co., 72 FERC ii 61,015 at 61,050 (1995). The Commission has the authority to engage 
in case-by-case analysis in setting out its standards and requirements for implementation of 
PURPA. Power Resource Group v. PUC of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2005) citing 
Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of 
[PURPA}, 23 FERC ii 61,304 1983 WL 39627 (May 31, 1983); Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623, 
917 P.2d at 781. The Idaho PUC has exercised this authority for more than three decades. Re 
PURPA Rulemaking, Order No. 15746, 38 P.U.R. 4th 352 (1980). As the renewable and 
cogeneration industries have developed, the Commission has reviewed and modified its 
standards and requirements to implement PURP A in a way that is just and reasonable to 
ratepayers, in the public interest, and not discriminatory to the QFs. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304(a)(l ). 
The Commission has a long history of recognizing two methods by which a QF can 
obtain an avoided cost rate under PURP A in Idaho: (I) by entering into a signed contract with 
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the utility; or (2) by filing a meritorious complaint alleging that "a legally enforceable 
obligation" has arisen and, but for the conduct of the utility, there would be a contract. A. W 
Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P .2d at 845; Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC (Rosebud III), 131 
Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521 ( 1997). This Court has confirmed that a QF does not become eligible for 
an avoided cost rate until there is either a signed contract to sell at an established rate or a 
meritorious complaint alleging that the project is mature and that the project has attempted and 
failed to negotiate a contract with the utility. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. 
The IPUC's application of this framework conforms with FERC's analysis of its own 
standards. In JD Wind I, FERC succinctly stated, 
Thus, under our regulations, a QF has the option to commit itself to sell all or part 
of its electric output to an electric utility. While this may be done through a 
contract, if the electric utility refuses to sign a contract, the QF may seek state 
regulatory authority assistance to enforce the PURP A-imposed obligation on the 
electric utility to purchase from the QF, and a non-contractual, but still legally 
enforceable, obligation will be created pursuant to the state's implementation of 
PURPA. Accordingly, a QF, by committing itself to sell to an electric utility, also 
commits the electric utility to buy from the QF; these commitments result either in 
contracts or in non-contractual, but binding, legally enforceable obligations. 
JD Wind I, 129 FERC ~ 61,148 at 61,633 (Nov. 19, 2009)(emphases added). FERC determined 
that, regardless of whether the energy offered was firm or non-firm power, the QF was entitled to 
a legally enforceable obligation because the utility in JD Wind was refusing to enter into a 
contract with the QF. FERC refers to a legally enforceable obligation in the disjunctive - either 
a contract is entered into or a legally enforceable obligation is created. 18 C.F.R. § 292.304( d); 
JD Wind I, 129 FERC ~ 61,148. lfa contract is entered into, then the agreement itself reflects 
the legally enforceable obligations between the parties. 
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 22 
Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF incurs a legally enforceable 
obligation is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC. Either the parties 
enter into a legally enforceable obligation reflected through a contract between the parties or, if 
the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with a QF, the QF can file a 
complaint with the Idaho Commission, at which time the Commission will make a determination 
as to whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose. A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 
828 P.2d at 845. 
2. The Effective Date of the Agreements is December 28, 2010 
Based upon the express terms of the Agreements, the Commission found that their 
effective date was December 28, 2010. R. at 355-56 (Section 1.11 of each Agreement). On 
remand, the Commission found that "the Agreements were negotiated, agreed to, and executed 
by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that the effective date of the PP As is 
December 28, 2010." R. at 356. The Commission noted that each Agreement states that the 
"Effective Date" of each Agreement is "The date stated in the opening paragraph of this ... 
Agreement representing the date upon which this [Agreement] is fully executed by both Parties." 
R. at 355-56 citing PPA § 1.11 and p. 1 (R. at 25, 90); R. at 229. In addition, Section 5.1 of each 
Agreement provides that "this Agreement shall become effective on the date first vvTitten .... " 
R. at 32, 97, 356. Again, the opening paragraph of each Agreement expressly states that it is 
"entered into on this 281h day of December, 2010 between Grouse Creek ... and IDAHO 
POWER COMPANY." R. at 23, 88. This language is clear and unambiguous. Potlatch Educ. 
Ass 'n. v. Potlatch Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). 
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The Commission has the authority to implement PURP A and is the appropriate state 
forum to review agreements and resolve disputes between QFs and electric utilities. A. W 
Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 843; Empire Lumber Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 
114 Idaho 191, 755 P.2d 1229 (1987); Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503 (the Commission has the 
authority to investigate and approve contracts affecting rates). It is the State, not FERC, that is 
to determine the specific parameters of individual PURP A agreements. R. at 356 citing Rosebud 
I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 781. The express language of the Agreements provides the 
Commission with substantial and competent evidence supporting its finding that these 
Agreements were effective December 28, 2010. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d 
at 789. 
3. Each Agreement Contained a Merger or Integration Clause 
In its remand Order, the Commission also found that each Agreement contains an 
integration or merger clause. R. at 359. Section 29.1 (entitled "Entire Agreement") of each 
Agreement states that: "This Agreement constitutes the entire Agreement of the Parties 
concerning the subject matter hereof and supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written 
agreements between the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof." R. at 54, 119 (emphasis 
added). This Court has recently held that "[i]f a written contract contains a merger clause, then it 
is complete upon its face." City of Meridian at Slip Op. at 6 citing Howard v. Perry, 141 Idaho 
139, 141, 106 P.3d 465, 468 (2005). As the Court explained in City of Meridian and Howard: 
The purpose of a merger clause is to establish that the parties have agreed that the 
contract contains the parties' entire agreement. The merger clause is not merely a 
factor to consider in deciding whether the agreement is integrated; it proves the 
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Id. 
agreement is integrated. To hold otherwise would require the parties to list in the 
contract everything upon which they had not agreed and hoped that such list 
covers every possible prior or contemporaneous agreement that could later be 
challenged. 
In its remand Order No. 32635, the Commission observed the general rule is that "when a 
contract has been reduced to writing, which the parties intend to be a complete statement of their 
agreement, any other written or oral agreement or understanding . . . made prior to or 
contemporaneously with the written 'contract' and which relates to the same subject matter are 
not admissible to very, contradict or enlarge the terms of the written contract." R. at 359 quoting 
Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., 102 Idaho 26, 28, 624 P.2d 408, 410 (1981). The Commission 
found that Grouse Creek had executed the contracts including its integration or merger clause set 
out in Section 29.1. "Thus, Grouse Creek accepted that, by entering into the PP As, all prior 
agreements would be replaced by the terms of the written and signed PP As - including any 
agreement or understanding as to a prior legally enforceable obligation." R. at 359 citing 
Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644-45, 249 P.3d 829, 837-38 (2011); Silver Syndicate v. 
Sunshine Mining Co., 101Idaho226, 235, 611P.2d1011, 1022 (1979). 
The Commission found that the effective date of each Agreement was December 28, 
2010, and that each Agreement contained an integration or merger clause. R. at 355-56, 359. 
Consequently, the Commission concluded that the Agreements became effective after the 
eligibility cap had been reduced on December 14, 2010. "Because the size of each Grouse Creek 
project exceeded 100 kW and each Agreement became effective after December 14, 2010," the 
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Commission found that it could not approve the Agreements containing rates which were no 
longer available to projects in excess of 100 kW. R. at 356. These Commission findings are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence, and this Court must affirm those findings. 
Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789; Idaho Power Co. v. Idaho Dept. of Water 
Resources, 151 Idaho 266, 277, 255 P.3d 1152, 1158 (2011). The Commission's findings with 
respect to the effective date and the effect of the integration/merger clause are both questions of 
state contract law. R. at 356; Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 623, 917 P.2d at 817; Grouse Creek Wind, 
142 FERC ~ 61,187, P.41 (2013). 
In this case, the utility did not refuse to sign a contract. In fact, ongoing negotiations led 
to the parties' voluntarily entering into two subsequent PPAs. R. at 355, 358-59. Grouse Creek 
filed complaints with the Commission because the Projects feared what effect the November 5, 
2010, joint filing of the utilities would have on its contracts - not because Idaho Power was 
refusing to negotiate or acting in bad faith. Grouse Creek admits that the November 5 joint filing 
"and its request for immediate relief would have resulting [sic] in denying Grouse Creek access 
to the published avoided cost rate that was fundamental to the financial viability of the Grouse 
Creek projects. As a consequence, on November 8, 2010 Grouse Creek filed complaints .... " 
Appellant's Brief at 12. Grouse Creek never initiated a complaint process because it was 
actively negotiating with Idaho Power. Indeed, agreements were executed and Grouse Creek 
urged the Commission to approve the terms of the Agreements. R. at 181. Because the utility 
did not impede Grouse Creek's ability to enter into PPAs, a determination regarding a non-
contractual legally enforceable obligation was wholly unnecessary. R. at 358. 
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Grouse Creek argues that "[i]t is antithetical to think that the act of memorializing a 
legally enforceable obligation in a subsequent contract can extinguish that same legally 
enforceable obligation." Appellant's Brief at 23. And yet, Grouse Creek voluntarily agreed to 
contract provisions, in the form of an integration clause, that acknowledge the parties' 
understanding that the terms of the signed, written Agreements expressly supersede "all prior or 
contemporaneous oral or written agreements" between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. R. at 
355, 358 citing R. at 54 (Agreements~ 29.1 ). The Agreements' integration clause is consistent 
with the general rule that "when a contract has been reduced to writing, which the parties intend 
to be a complete statement of their agreement, any other written or oral agreements or 
understandings ... made prior to or contemporaneously with the written 'contract' and which 
relate to the same subject matter are not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the terms of the 
written contract." Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc., 102 Idaho at 28, 624 P.2d at 410. 
Grouse Creek's argument that the Commission acted arbitrarily and unreasonably in 
rejecting the Agreements' avoided cost rates is, at best, unsupported by the record and, at worst, 
self-serving. Grouse Creek asks the Court to recognize and enforce the terms of the Agreements 
regarding avoided cost rates, but would have the Court ignore the contract provisions related to 
not only the integration of prior or contemporaneous agreements but also any reference to an 
effective date of the Agreements.4 R. at 358, 359. It is beyond refute that the Agreements 
represent the terms and conditions, i.e., legally enforceable obligations, negotiated and agreed to 
4 Section 21 of each Agreement states that the Agreements will not become effective until the Commission has 
approved all of the Agreements' terms and conditions. R. at 52 (Agreement at~ 21 ). 
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 27 
by the parties. It is also clear that the Agreements contain provisions regarding integration of 
prior/contemporaneous agreements and terms defining the effective date. Id. 
Grouse Creek has further misconstrued and taken out of context the Commission's 
reference to a "bright line rule" first contained in its June 8, 2011, Order. In the underlying 
administrative case, the Commission was asked to "accept or reject" power purchase agreements 
entered into between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power. In reviewing the two Agreements, the 
Commission observed that 
The primary issue to be determined in these cases is whether the Agreements -
which utilize the published avoided cost rate - were executed before the eligibility 
cap for published rates was lowered to 100 kW on December 14, 2010, for wind 
and solar projects. 
R. at 229. The Commission was left to determine, based on the facts before it, whether the terms 
of the Grouse Creek Agreements would entitle the Projects to published avoided cost rates or 
rates calculated through use of the IRP Methodology. Because the Commission reduced 
eligibility to published avoided cost rates effective December 14, 2010, it is axiomatic that 
contracts entered into after December 14, 2010, would be evaluated by the Commission based on 
the current eligibility standards. The Commission's pronouncement of a "bright line rule'' was 
simply an attempt to put the parties on notice regarding the Commission's intent to enforce the 
December 14 effective date regarding the modified eligibility standards. 
The Agreements submitted to the Commission included all of the terms and conditions 
negotiated and agreed to by the parties. The Commission did not substitute a fully-executed 
contract standard in place of a legally enforceable obligation, nor did the Commission require a 
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fully-executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable 
obligation. R. at 356. The Commission simply recognized the terms of the Agreements as 
submitted. As stated by the Commission, "[i]t would be unreasonable and arbitrary for us to 
supplant the agreed upon terms of a negotiated and signed contract with additional terms and/or 
conditions without a compelling reason." R. at 358. The Commission further found that 
approving the Agreements would not be in the public interest. R. at 361. The Commission's 
findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
C. Grandfathering the Agreements would Contradict the Underlying Rationale 
Grouse Creek argues that the Commission's failure to "grandfather" its Agreements was 
arbitrary and capricious and a violation of previously established precedent regarding prior 
grandfathering of avoided cost rates. Appellant's Brief at 26. Grouse Creek references a change 
in eligibility in the 1990's and again in 2005, when the Commission adopted criteria to evaluate 
grandfathering eligibility. Appellant's Brief at 27. 
It is true that, in the past, the Commission has allowed for "grandfathered" or "vintage" 
rates - in other words, the right to obtain avoided cost rates that are no longer in place. 
Traditionally, in order for a QF to be eligible for grandfathered rates, the QF either had to have 
already signed a contract with the utility to produce and sell energy or the QF had to have filed a 
meritorious complaint with the PUC alleging that the utility had declined to enter into a contract 
with them. A.W Brown, 121 Idaho at 814, 828 P.2d at 843. A meritorious complaint must 
allege and prove "( 1) that the project was substantially mature to the extent that would justify 
finding that the developer was ready, willing and able to sign a contract and (2) that the 
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developer had actively negotiated for a contract which, but for the reluctance of the utility, would 
have been executed." Id. 
This Court has stated that "[c]onferment of grandfathered status on [a] qualifying facility 
is essentially an IPUC finding that a legally enforceable obligation to sell power existed by a 
given date. Such a finding is within the discretion of the state regulatory agency." Rosebud I, 
128 Idaho at 624, 917 P.2d at 781. The Commission has utilized its discretion in the past and 
articulated certain standards that would allow projects to obtain outdated avoided cost rates. 
With the change in eligibility in the most recent instance (December 2010), the Commission's 
decision was void of any circumstances that would allow projects to obtain the avoided cost rates 
under the old eligibility standards. The Commission clearly chose not to adopt and/or allow 
projects to obtain grandfathered rates. 
The decision to not allow for grandfathered rates was within the Commission's discretion 
and adequately supported by the record. The Commission explained that "[ w]ind and solar 
resources present unique characteristics that differentiate them from other PURPA QFs. Wind 
and solar generation, integration, capacity and ability to disaggregate provide a basis for 
distinguishing the eligibility cap for wind and solar from other resources." Commission Order 
No. 32176 at 9. The Commission expressed its concern that large wind and solar projects could 
disaggregate - form several smaller projects - in order to obtain eligibility to published avoided 
cost rates that were not an accurate reflection of the utility's avoided cost for such projects. Id. at 
11. The Commission's underlying rationale for changing project eligibility to published avoided 
cost rates was that disaggregated wind and solar projects were obtaining contracts containing 
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avoided cost rates that did not represent the utility's actual avoided costs. Id. It would, then, be 
ridiculous for the Commission to establish criteria through which these very projects could 
obtain avoided cost rates that the Commission found to be inappropriate. "When this 
Commission reduced wind and solar projects' eligibility to published avoided cost rates we 
unequivocally stated that continuing to allow large wind and solar projects access to published 
avoided cost rates for projects greater than 100 kW was 'clearly not in the public interest."' R. at 
265 quoting Order No. 32262.5 
This Court has held that, "Because regulatory bodies perform legislative as well as 
judicial functions in their proceedings, they are not so rigorously bound by the doctrine of stare 
decisis that they must decide all future cases in the same way as they have decided similar cases 
in the past." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 618, 917 P.2d at 775 citing Intermountain Gas Co. v. Idaho 
PUC, 97 Idaho 113, 119, 540 P.2d 775, 781 (1975); R. at 262. "Because each case presents a 
myriad of facts that distinguish it, no one case represents the law by which subsequent parties are 
bound." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 615. "So long as the Commission enters sufficient findings to 
show that its action is not arbitrary and capricious, the Commission can alter its decisions." 
Washington Water Power v. Idaho PUC, 101 Idaho 567, 579, 617 P.2d 1242, 1254 (1980). As 
we stated in our final Order on Reconsideration, "simply because grandfathering criteria have 
been used in consideration of QF eligibility to published rates in the past does not mean that this 
Commission must decide all future QF eligibility cases in the same manner. . . . In contrast to 
the change in eligibility for published rates in 2005, no criteria were enunciated or established by 
5 Although Order No. 32299 presented a thorough review of the facts, reasoning and law in the underlying decision, 
the Commission ultimately denied Grouse Creek's Petition for Reconsideration. 
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this Commission to determine project eligibility through the use of grandfathering for QF 
agreements executed on or after December 14, 2010." R. at 263. 
It is clear from Order No. 32635 that the Commission accepted certain evidence and 
discarded other evidence. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 293, 1 P.3d at 794. The 
Commission's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. The 
Commission has consistently interpreted and utilized the terms of the Agreements in order to 
determine when the parties incurred a legally enforceable obligation. In this case, the terms of 
the legally enforceable obligation between Idaho Power and Grouse Creek are represented within 
the terms of the Agreements negotiated and entered into between the parties. 
The Commission's disapproval of the Agreements between Idaho Power and Grouse 
Creek was based upon substantial and competent evidence and was a proper exercise of the 
Commission's discretion. There are also sufficient findings to show that the Commission's 
decision regarding whether to use grandfathering criteria is not arbitrary and capricious. 
Washington Water Power, 101 Idaho at 579, 617 P.2d at 1254. The Commission's decisions are 
supported by the record. Consequently, the Court must affirm these findings and the 
Commission's decision. Industrial Customers, 134 Idaho at 288, 1 P.3d at 789; Hulet, 138 Idaho 
476, 65 P.2d 498 (2003). 
D. The Commission is not Preventing Grouse Creek from Obtaining a PURPA Agreement 
Grouse Creek maintains that non-published rates for wind power are significantly less 
than published rates. Appellant's Brief at 5. Conspicuously absent from Grouse Creek's 
argument is any allegation that the non-published rate results in an avoided cost that is a 
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violation of PURP A or FERC regulations. The Commission has authority under PURP A and 
FERC regulations to set avoided costs, to order electric utilities to enter into fixed-term 
obligations for the purchase of energy from QFs and to implement FERC rules. A. W Brown, 
121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. Under PURPA regulations issued by FERC, the Idaho PUC 
must "publish" avoided cost rates for small QFs with a design capacity of 100 kW or less. 18 
C.F.R. § 292.304(c). When a QF project is larger than the published eligibility cap the avoided 
cost rate for the project must be individually negotiated by the QF . 
. . . PURPA requires an electric utility to purchase power from a QF, but only if 
the QF sells at a price no higher than the cost the utility would have incurred for 
the power if it had not purchased the QF's energy and/or capacity, i.e., would 
have generated itself or purchased from another source. The intention was to 
make ratepayers indifferent as to whether the utility used more traditional sources 
of power or the newly-encouraged alternatives. 
Southern Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, 71 FERC ii 61,269 at 62,079-62,080 
(1995). FERC provides no precise formula for calculating a utility's avoided costs. 
In Idaho, the Commission has evaluated and approved the Integrated Resource Planning 
(IRP) Methodology for calculating avoided cost rates in individually negotiated QF contracts. 
The purpose of utilizing the IRP Methodology for large QF projects is to more precisely value 
the energy being delivered. The IRP Methodology recognizes the individual generation 
characteristics of each project by assessing when the QF is capable of delivering its resources 
against when the utility is most in need of such resources. The resultant pricing is reflective of 
the value of QF energy to the utility. 
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Utilization of the IRP Methodology does not negate the requirement under PURP A that 
the utility purchase the QF energy at the utility's avoided cost. While Grouse Creek has stated 
that the IRP Methodology results in a lower avoided cost rate for its project than the published 
rate that the Projects seek, Grouse Creek has not argued that the IRP avoided cost rate is illegal, 
illogical or otherwise in violation of PURP A or FERC regulations. The Agreements presented to 
the Commission for approval utilized published avoided cost rates. As stated by the 
Commission, "allowing a project to avail itself of an eligibility cap (and therefore published 
rates) that is no longer applicable could cause ratepayers to pay more than the utility's avoided 
cost." R. at 259. This Court has held that allowing QFs to obtain avoided cost rates that exceed 
the utility's actual avoided cost "would be in direct violation of PURP A policies." A. W Brown, 
121 Idaho at 817, 828 P.2d at 846. This Court has also recognized that "a balance must be struck 
between the local public interest of a utility's electric consumers and the national public interest 
in development of alternative energy sources." Rosebud I, 128 Idaho at 613, 917 P.2d at 770. 
Furthermore, FERC has stated that 
as the electric utility industry becomes increasingly competitive, the need to 
ensure that the States are using procedures which ensure that QF rates do not 
exceed avoided cost becomes more critical. This is because QF rates that exceed 
avoided cost will, by definition, give QFs an unfair advantage over other market 
participants (non-QFs). This, in tum, will hinder the development of competitive 
markets and hurt ratepayers, a result clearly at odds with ensuring the just and 
reasonable rates required by PURP A section 21 O(b ). 
Southern Cal. Edison Co., San Diego Gas & Electric, 70 FERC ~ 61,125 at 61,675-61,676 
(1995). In rejecting the Agreements, the Commission was acting consistent with its 
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responsibilities delegated by FERC. The eligibility to published avoided cost rates was modified 
to prevent QFs from obtaining rates that exceed a utility's true avoided cost. 
Grouse Creek is entitled to a PURP A agreement. Pursuant to PURP A and FERC 
regulations, the rates contained within its Agreements must be just and reasonable to utility 
customers, in the public interest, and nondiscriminatory to the QFs - but the rates should also be 
no more than the cost that the utility would have incurred had it produced or procured the energy 
itself. The Commission acted consistently with these objectives when it relied upon the express 
terms of the Grouse Creek Agreements in determining when the Agreements became effective. 
Based on the terms of the Agreements, Grouse Creek's legally enforceable obligation became 
effective against Idaho Power on December 28, 2010. Grouse Creek's avoided cost rates are 
appropriately calculated utilizing the IRP Methodology. R. at 230. This finding is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
E. Declaratory Orders Issued by FERC 
Grouse Creek's argument relies heavily on FERC's statement of position presented in 
four declaratory orders issued in response to Petitions for Enforcement filed with FERC by QFs 
whose contracts had been disapproved by the Idaho Commission. However, a declaratory order 
"that does no more than announce the [FERC' s] interpretation of the PURP A or one of the 
agency's implementing regulations is of no legal moment unless and until a district court adopts 
that interpretation when called upon to enforce the PURPA." Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. 
FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488, (D.C. Cir. 1997). For this reason, Grouse Creek's appeal must fail. 
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Unlike the declaratory order of a court, which does fix the rights of the parties, 
this [FERC] Declaratory Order merely advised the parties of the [FERC's] 
position. It was much like a memorandum of law prepared by the FERC staff in 
anticipation of a possible enforcement action; the only difference is that the 
[FERC] itself formally used the document as its own statement of position. While 
such knowledge of the FERC's position might affect the conduct of the parties, 
the Declaratory Order is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to persuade (or to 
command the deference of) a [district] court that might later have been called 
upon to interpret the Act and the agency's regulations in an [sic] private 
enforcement action .... " 
Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C.Cir. 1995). Consequently, any 
argument by Grouse Creek that FERC's declaratory orders are somehow binding on the 
Commission or this Court are illusory only. 
Furthermore, the Court should not be persuaded by FERC's statement of position. FERC 
found the Commission in violation of PURP A and FERC regulations because "when a state 
limits the methods through which a legally enforceable obligation may be created to only a fully-
executed contract, the state's limitation is inconsistent with PURP A and our regulations 
implementing PURPA." Cedar Creek Wind, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 (2011). However, the 
language in FERC's opinion puts into question whether FERC understood the basis upon which 
the Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the Agreements. R. at 356-357. 
The Commission clarified in its final Order on remand, 
we note that this Commission did not and has never made a determination that the 
creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility 
enter into a written and signed agreement. In our prior Orders in this case, we 
found that Grouse Creek and Idaho Power entered into Agreements with one 
another that specifically stated the terms and conditions of the Agreements -
including the effective date. We recognized and chose to enforce the terms of the 
Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily. 
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R. at 230. The Commission explicitly recognized a QF's ability to obtain a legally enforceable 
obligation outside the terms of a written contract. The Commission's "bright line rule" was not a 
pronouncement that a legally enforceable obligation can only be incurred with a written and 
signed agreement. The "bright line rule" simply identified the date upon which the change in 
eligibility to published rates became effective. The Commission then recognized that the express 
terms of Grouse Creek's Agreements identified an effective date of December 28, 2010, and 
included a merger/integration clause. Based on these facts, the Projects were clearly not eligible 
for published avoided cost rates. 
Grouse Creek also argues (Supp. Brief 5-6) that FERC's Grouse Creek Order condemns 
this Commission's procedure of allowing a PURP A developer to file a complaint against a utility 
in order to establish whether a legally enforceable obligation exists in the absence of an 
agreement. In its Order, FERC stated that the procedure "unreasonably interfere[s] with a QF's 
right to a legally enforceable obligation." 142 FERC ~ 61, 187 P. 40. However, this procedure is 
merely the mechanism used by the Commission to investigate whether, in fact, the QF perfected 
a legally enforceable obligation. More importantly, this Court has approved this procedure in 
Rosebud III, 131 Idaho 1, 951 P.2d 521; see also A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845. 
The process meets fundamental due process requirements. Without an investigation or 
proceeding, the Commission would have no record upon which to base its findings and 
conclusions. The complaint proceeding is merely the Commission's implementation of PURP A. 
Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503; A. W Brown, 121 Idaho at 816, 828 P.2d at 845; Empire Lumber, 
114 Idaho at 191, 755 P.2d at 1229. 
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It is clear that FERC did not fully understand the underlying facts and law upon which 
the Commission's decision was based. The Commission performed a thorough review of the 
arguments, weighed the evidence and determined that, pursuant to the terms of the Agreements 
entered into by the parties, Grouse Creek was not entitled to published avoided cost rates. The 
Commission amply articulated the findings to support its conclusion. These findings are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
F. Grouse Creek did not Pursue its Complaints 
Grouse Creek's arguments that it established a legally enforceable obligation prior to the 
date upon which eligibility to published avoided cost rates changed misses the point entirely. 
Because Grouse Creek entered into a contract that not only contained explicit terms as to when 
the contract became effective but also included an integration or merger clause that negated any 
prior or contemporaneous agreements, any determination of whether or when a legally 
enforceable obligation was incurred is superfluous and carries no weight. City of Meridian v. 
Petra, Inc., Idaho_, Slip Op. No. 43 at 6. The simple fact is that Grouse Creek did not pursue 
its November 8 complaints. App. at B. 
Grouse Creek goes to great lengths to present arguments related to transmission, project 
location and commercial operation dates in order to establish that the Commission's rejection of 
these issues proves that the facts used by the Commission in coming to its decision are 
unsupported by the record. Appellant's Brief at 9-12. The Commission did not attribute any 
weight to these issues because they are not appropriate in the context of a proceeding where a 
negotiated contract is submitted for the Commission's review and approval. It is within the 
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Commission's authority to weigh the evidence that is presented. Industrial Customers, 134 
Idaho 285, 1 P.3d 786. Terms and conditions regarding the legally enforceable obligations 
between Grouse Creek and Idaho Power are presumed to be included within the provisions of the 
contracts. If Grouse Creek wanted the Commission to weigh in on whether Idaho Power acted in 
such a way as to delay or impede contract negotiations then Grouse Creek should have pursued 
its complaints. But it did not. App. at B. As the Commission found in its remand Order, Grouse 
Creek's complaints were not considered, evaluated, weighed or ruled upon because Grouse 
Creek requested that the complaints not be served. R. at 360. The complaints were not 
processed because Grouse Creek "tentatively reached a settlement with Idaho Power and 
respectfully requests that the Commission not serve a summons on Idaho Power at this time." 
Augmented Record (Ref. 13-118). Grouse Creek supported approval of Agreements containing 
outdated avoided cost rates and only accused Idaho Power of delaying contract negotiations out 
of fear that the Projects would otherwise not be entitled to published avoided cost rates. 
The facts, as presented by Grouse Creek, regarding transmission and who said what to 
whom attempt to distract from the facts that are actually pertinent to the underlying issues in this 
case. Grouse Creek negotiated with Idaho Power. Grouse Creek entered into two Agreements 
with Idaho Power. Presumably, Grouse Creek assented to the terms of the Agreements or the 
contracts would not have been signed. The terms of the contracts control the agreement between 
the parties. R. at 359; Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 249 P.3d 829; Silver Syndicate v. 
Sunshine Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226, 611 P.2d 1011. Arguments regarding whether and when a 
legally enforceable obligation was incurred are appropriate in a complaint proceeding when a QF 
BRIEF OF THE IDAHO 
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION 39 
is arguing that, but for the conduct of the utility, the QF would have entered into a contract. A. W 
Brown, 121 Idaho 812, 828 P .2d 841; Rosebud III, 131 Idaho 1. If the Commission finds merit 
in the allegations of the QF, then the Commission looks to the totality of the circumstances to 
determine when the non-contractual, but nevertheless binding, legally enforceable obligation was 
formed. Such considerations are unnecessary here because the legally enforceable obligations 
between the parties are reflected in the negotiated terms of the executed Agreements. 
G. Grouse Creek is not Entitled to an Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Grouse Creek requests attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. More 
specifically, it asserts that "I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) provides that an award of attorney's fees under J.C. 
§ 12-121 is warranted when a case is defended unreasonable [sic] or without foundation." 
Appellant's Brief at 42. The request for attorney fees on appeal is without merit. It is well 
settled that Grouse Creek is not entitled to an award of attorney's fees on appeal under either 
Idaho Code§ 12-121 or I.R.C.P. 54 (e). 
First, this Court held in Eagle Water Co. v. Idaho PUC, that attorney's fees are "not 
available under J.C. § 12-121 in an appeal from an order of the IPUC because this type of case is 
not commenced by a complaint filed in a court action as required by l.C. § 12-121." 130 Idaho 
314, 318, 940 P.2d 1133, 113 7 (1997). Simply put, Idaho Code § 12-121 does not authorize an 
award of attorney fees on appeal from an agency ruling. Duncan v. State Board of Accountancy, 
149 Idaho 1, 5, 232 P.3d 322, 326 (2010) citing Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 36, 137 P.3d 417, 
423 (2006); Northwest Pipeline Corp. v. Dept. of Employment, 129 Idaho 548, 550-51, 928 P.2d 
898, 900-901 ( 1996). 
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Second, Rule 54( e) is not applicable because this appeal did not arise from a district court 
action. McNeal v. Idaho PUC, 142 Idaho 685, 690, 132 P.3d 442, 447 (2006). In addition, Rule 
54(e)(l) only governs procedures in the district court and the magistrate's division, "not the 
procedures on appeal to this court." Capps v. FIA Card Services, 149 Idaho 737, 744, 240 P.3d 
583, 590 (201 O); I.R.C.P. 1 (a). 
Third, the Commission has not acted unreasonably or without foundation in defending its 
Orders. The Commission has defended itself regarding the application of express contract 
provisions in the PP As at issue in this appeal. R. at 359 (Order No. 32635). Grouse Creek has 
made no persuasive argument why the effective date and integration or merger provisions should 
not control. 
Grouse Creek insists that the FERC orders are dispositive and controlling. Grouse 
Creek's reliance on recently issued FERC declaratory orders is misplaced. FERC's declaratory 
orders are not controlling on the Commission. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 117 
F.3d 1485, 1488 (1977); Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
(a "Declaratory Order merely advises the parties of the [FERC's] position."); R. at 356-57 (Order 
No. 32635). As discussed above, the Commission was acting within the scope of authority 
granted to it by PURPA and FERC regulations and recognized by the Court. R. at 358. 
Grouse Creek also argues that the Commission acted unreasonably by disregarding the 
PUC Staffs position. Appellant's Brief at 43. However, positions taken by the PUC Staff in a 
case has no binding effect on the Commission. Staff participates in Commission cases as an 
independent party in the same way any other party (e.g., Grouse Creek or Idaho Power) 
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participates. IPUC Rule 57, IDAPA 31.01.01.057. The Commission considers the arguments 
and submissions of all parties and, based on its review, assigns weight to the evidence that it 
believes is the most well-reasoned and supported by the record. In this case, after weighing the 
evidence, the Commission did not accept the Staffs position. 
Grouse Creek's argument (Br. at 43) equating Commission Staff to a hearing officer is 
without merit. A hearing officer within an agency is akin to an administrative law judge -
assigned to hear and decide cases based on the weight of the evidence. The Commission's Rules 
of Procedure clearly distinguish between a hearing officer and the PUC Staff. Compare Rule 57 
with Rule 258, IDAPA 31.01.01.057 and .258; See also Idaho Code § 61-211. Commission 
Staff did not serve a judicial function in this case. Commission Staff functions as a party to a 
case ... not the arbiter of the facts and law. IDAPA 31.01.01.057. 
Consequently, Grouse Creek's request for attorney's fees should be denied because it has 
failed to assert a legal basis upon which it is entitled to attorney's fees. Moreover, the 
Commission has not defended its Orders unreasonably or without foundation. 
CONCLUSION 
Much ado has been made about the phrase "legally . enforceable obligation." The 
Commission does not dispute that a legally enforceable obligation includes, but is not limited to, 
a contract. As is evident from prior Commission decisions, we agree that a legally enforceable 
obligation can exist in the absence of a contract, i.e., if a QF alleges that a utility is failing to 
negotiate and the QF is meritorious with its arguments in the form of a complaint proceeding 
before the Commission. What Grouse Creek fails to acknowledge is that a contract can, indeed, 
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be a form of legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Moreover, the PP As are the 
form of legally enforceable obligation which Grouse Creek voluntarily chose to enter. Grouse 
Creek specifically abdicated any argument that Idaho Power was failing or refusing to negotiate 
when it suspended its complaint proceeding before the Commission and continued negotiations 
with the utility eventually resulting in two agreements between the parties. 
As set out above, the Commission regularly pursued its authority by reviewing the 
Grouse Creek Agreements based on the Commission's applicable PURP A standards. The 
IPUC's findings and conclusions are amply supported by competent and substantial evidence. 
The Commission's decision to not apply grandfathering criteria that would have allowed the 
Grouse Creek projects access to vintage avoided cost rates is supported by sufficient evidence 
and was within the Commission's discretion. Finally, attorney fees on appeal are not authorized 
under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
The Court should affirm Order No. 32635. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 5th day of April 2013. 
Kristi~A~A. Sasser ""' 
Donald L. Howell, II 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Attorneys for the 
Idaho Public Utilities Commission 
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ORDER NO. 32635 
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Final Order on Reconsideration No. 32299 
affirming its initial decision to not approve two Power Purchase Agreements ("PP As" or 
"Agreements") entered into between the Grouse Creek Wind Park projects (collectively referred 
to as "Grouse Creek") and Idaho Power Company pursuant to the federal Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). Based upon the express terms of the Abrreements, 
the Commission found that the PPAs were not effective prior to December 14, 2010- the date on 
which the eligibility for PU RP A published avoided cost rates in Idaho changed from I 0 average 
megawatts (aMW) to I 00 kilowatts (kW) for wind and solar qualifying facilities (QFs). Final 
Order No. 32257. Because each of the PPAs requested published avoided cost rates but the 
projects were in excess of 100 kW, the Commission found that the published rates were not 
available to the wind projects. 
ORDER NO. 32635 
On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. On October 4, 2011, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
issued a Declaratory Order in what appeared to be a similarly situated case ('"the Cedar Creek 
Case") stating that the Idaho Commission's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PP As was 
inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations. Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory 
Order, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011). On November 3, 2011, in response to FERC's 
Declaratory Order, Grouse Creek, this Commission and Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion 
with the Idaho Supreme Court to suspend the appeal and remand the matter to the PUC. The 
Court granted the Motion on November 22, 2011. 
Grouse Creek, Idaho Power and Commission Staff met to discuss settlement of the 
issues on December 9, 2011, and December 22, 2011. Settlement discussions were unfruitful. 
The Commission directed the parties to file legal briefs and oral argument was held on March 7, 
2012. After reviewing the underlying record, arguments of the parties and controlling statutory 
and case law, we decline to approve the two Power Purchase Agreements between Grouse Creek 
and Idaho Power based on the avoided cost rates contained in the Agreements, and as more fully 
described herein. 
BACKGROUND 
A. The Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
On December 28, 2010, Idaho Power and the two Grouse Creek wind projects 
entered into their respective PP As. Under the terms of the PP As, each wind project agrees to sell 
electric energy to Idaho Power for a 20-year term using 10 aMW non-levelized published 
avoided cost rates. Applications at 4. The nameplate rating of each project is 21 MW. Under 
normal and/or average conditions, each wind QF will not sell more than 10 aMW on a monthly 
basis to Idaho Power. The projects are located near Lynn, Utah. 
Each project selected June 1, 2013, as the "Scheduled First Energy Date" and 
December 1, 2013, as the "Scheduled Operation Date." Applications at 5. Idaho Power asserted 
that it advised each project of the project's responsibility to work with Idaho Power's delivery 
business unit to ensure that sufficient time and resources would be available for the delivery unit 
to construct the necessary interconnection facilities, and transmission upgrades if required, in 
time to allow the projects to achieve their December 1, 2013, Scheduled Operation Date. The 
Applications state that the projects have been advised that delays in the interconnection or 
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transmission process do not constitute excusable delays and if a project fails to achieve its 
Scheduled Operation Date, delay damages will be assessed. Id. at 6. The Applications further 
maintain that Grouse Creek has acknowledged and accepted the risks inherent in proceeding with 
its PPAs without knowledge of the actual requirements for interconnection facilities and possible 
transmission upgrades. Id. at 7. In each PPA, the parties have agreed to liquidated damage and 
security provisions of $45 per kW of nameplate capacity. Agreements ~·~ 5.3.2, 5.8.1. Idaho 
Power also maintained that each project was aware of and accepted the provisions in the 
Agreements and Idaho Power's approved Schedule 72 regarding non-compensated curtailment or 
disconnection of the project should certain operating conditions develop on Idaho Power's 
system. 
By its own terms, the "Effective Date" for each PPA is "[t]he date stated in the 
opening paragraph of this Firm Energy Sales Agreement representing the date upon which this 
Firm Energy Sales Agreement was fully executed by both Parties." Agreements ~ 1.11. The 
opening paragraph of each Agreement reflects that they were "entered into" on December 28, 
20 I 0. Id. at p. I. Each Agreement further states that it will not become effective until the 
Commission has approved all of the terms and conditions and declares that all payments made by 
Idaho Power to Grouse Creek for purchases of energy will be allowed as prudently incurred 
expenses for ratemaking purposes. Agreements~ 21.1. 
B. Order No. 32257 
On June 8, 2011, the Commission issued final Order No. 32257 disapproving the two 
Agreements between Idaho Power and each of the wind projects - Grouse Creek Wind Park and 
Grouse Creek Wind Park II. 1 The Commission determined that the Agreements were not fully 
executed (signed by both parties) prior to December 14, 20 I 0, the date upon which the eligibility 
for published avoided cost rates changed from 10 aMW to 100 kW for wind and solar projects. 
Order No. 32176. Consequently, the Commission found that the rates contained in the 
Agreements were no longer available because each of the projects requested published avoided 
cost rates and each QF was larger than 100 kW. Order No. 32257 at 10. 
The Commission found that Grouse Creek signed each Agreement on December 20, 
20 I 0, and Idaho Power signed on December 28, 20 I 0. Id. at 9. The Commission also noted that 
1 The two projects had previously filed consolidated comments maintaining that the "relevant facts for each of these 
two projects are substantially similar." Project Comments at n. I. Consequently, the Commission found it 
reasonable and appropriate to consolidate the cases and issue a consolidated final Order. Order No. 32257 at n. I. 
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the Agreements contain language regarding the effective date. The terms of the Agreements 
unequivocally state that the "Effective Date" of the Agreements is "The date stated in the 
opening paragraph of this ... Agreement representing the date upon which this [Agreement] was 
fully executed by both Parties." Agreements ~ 1.10. The opening paragraph is dated "this 28 
day of December, 20 IO." 
The Commission stated that "[t]he Commission does not consider a utility and its 
ratepayers obligated until both parties have completed their final reviews and signed the 
agreement." Order No. 32257 at 9. The Commission observed that "a thorough review is 
appropriate and necessary prior to signing Agreements that obligate ratepayers to payments in 
excess of $230 million" over the 20-year term of the Agreements. Id. The Commission 
established a bright line rule that for a wind or solar QF larger than I 00 kW to be eligible for 
published avoided cost rates, the Power Purchase Agreement must have been executed, i.e., 
signed by both parties, prior to the December 14, 20 I 0, effective date of the change in eligibility 
criteria. Id. at I 0. The Commission concluded that it was "not in the public interest to allow 
parties with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of an 
eligibility cap that is no longer applicable." Id. 
C. Reconsideration of Order No. 32257 
On June 29, 2011, Grouse Creek filed a timely Petition for Reconsideration of the 
Commission's final Order No. 32257. Grouse Creek argued that, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 
292.304(d)(2)(ii), a QF is entitled to the rates that are in effect on the date the QF incurred a 
legally enforceable obligation to provide energy. The projects maintained that the "obligation to 
purchase a QF's output is created by the QF committing itself to sell to an electric utility, which 
also commits the electric utility to buy from the QF." Reconsideration Petition at 5. Based on 
this premise, Grouse Creek argued that the Commission's final Order was arbitrary and 
capricious and not in conformity with controlling federal law because it requires a utility's 
signature to establish a legally enforceable obligation. 
On July 6, 2011, Idaho Power filed an Answer to the Petition for Reconsideration. 
Idaho Power maintained that the Commission's final Order is based on substantial and 
competent evidence. The utility asserted that it was "not in the public interest to allow parties 
with contracts executed on or after December 14, 2010, to avail themselves of [a published rate] 
that is no longer applicable." Answer at 6 quoting Order No. 32257 at 9. Idaho Power asserted 
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that the Commission was acting within its discretion and, therefore, reconsideration should be 
denied. Id. at 8-9. 
On July 27, 2011, the Commission issued Order No. 3 2299 denying the projects' 
Petition for Reconsideration. The Order stated that the parties entered into a legally enforceable 
obligation at the time that both parties executed the Power Purchase Agreements. By their very 
terms, the Agreements were not effective until December 28, 20 I 0. Agreements~ I .11. On that 
date, wind projects larger than I 00 kW were no longer entitled to the I 0 aMW published avoided 
cost rate. This Commission explained that "FERC regulations grant the states latitude in 
implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." Order 
32299 at 7 citing Federal Energy Regulatory Commission v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 
2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 ( 1982). In determining when the parties incurred a legally enforceable 
obligation, the Commission properly exercised the authority granted us by FERC. Id. 
The Commission further explained that nothing cited by Grouse Creek demonstrated 
that the Commission's Order is arbitrary, capricious or inconsistent with federal law. The 
Commission noted that FERC specifically delegated authority to the state commissions to 
determine when and how a legally enforceable obligation is created. The Commission also 
determined that its decision is in the public interest and strikes a balance between "the local 
public interest of a utility's electric consumers and the national public interest in development of 
alternative energy sources.'' Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 613, 917 P.2d 
766, 770 (1996). 
D. Appeal and Remand 
On September 7, 2011, Grouse Creek appealed the Commission's Orders to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. On October 4, 2011, while the appeal was pending, FERC issued a Declaratory 
Order in the Cedar Creek case that the PUC's decision not to approve Cedar Creek's PPAs was 
inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations implementing PURPA. Notice of Intent Not 
to Act and Declaratory Order, 13 7 FERC ~ 61,006 (Oct. 4, 2011 ). FERC construed this 
Commission's final Order in the Cedar Creek case as "limiting the creation of a legally 
enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PPAs] ... signed by both parties to the 
agreement." Id. at iJ 26. FERC interpreted our Order as requiring a fully-executed contract as a 
condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable obligation between the parties. Id. at 
i;iJ 30, 35. FERC concluded that our Cedar Creek Orders did not recognize that "a legally 
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enforceable obligation may be incurred before the formal memorialization of a contract to 
writing." Id. at~ 36. 
On November 3, 2011, in response to FER C's Order, Grouse Creek, this Commission 
and Idaho Power filed a Stipulated Motion to suspend the Idaho Supreme Court appeal and 
remand the matter to the Commission for further consideration. The Motion stated that there "is 
good cause for the Court to grant this Motion in order for the Parties to consider a recent decision 
issued by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") regarding the subject matter of 
the appeal.'' Motion at 2. Moreover, Idaho Code § 61-624 provides that the Commission ''may 
at any time, upon notice to the public utility affected, and after opportunity to be heard ... , 
rescind, alter or amend any order or decision made by it." The Court granted the Stipulated 
Motion on November 22, 2011. 
On remand, the Commission invited the parties to participate in settlement 
negotiations. See IPUC Rule 353, JDAPA 31.01.01.353; Order No. 32430. Grouse Creek, Idaho 
Power and Commission Staff met to discuss settlement of the issues on December 9 and 
December 22, 2011. Settlement negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful. Consequently, the 
Commission directed the parties to file legal briefs and scheduled an oral argument for March 7, 
2012. Order No. 32430. The parties' arguments on remand are set out below. 
1. The Grouse Creek Projects 
Grouse Creek maintains that it attempted to secure PPAs with Idaho Power for 
several months prior to December 14, 2010. Initially, in April 2010, the developer requested a 
PURPA contract for a 65 MW project. Grouse Creek Brief at 9. In June 2010, Grouse Creek 
indicated that, due to federal permitting issues, it intended to reduce the overall footprint of the 
project and wanted to discuss two 10 aMW projects, instead of the larger 65 MW project. Id at 
6, 9-10. 
Grouse Creek maintains that, on July 14, 20 I 0, it submitted a formal request to Idaho 
Power for two 10 aMW PU RP A contracts. Id at 9-10. The projects reiterated their request for 
two PURPA contracts on August 17, 2010. Id at 1 I. Grouse Creek asserts that, on October 1, 
2010, it sent a letter to Idaho Power "for each Grouse Creek QF, expressing [the projects] intent 
to obligate the QFs to two power sales agreements for the two QF projects." Id. Grouse Creek 
insists that the letters "listed several standard terms applicable through Commission orders," 
including the load shape price adjustments, wind integration charge, mechanical availability 
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guarantee, and wind forecasting and cost sharing provisions. Id. However, the projects were 
disputing the legality of a $45/k W delay liquidated damages provision. Id. at 12. On or about 
November I, 2010, Idaho Power provided draft PP As for the projects. The utility insisted on the 
inclusion of the standard $45/kW delay security deposit. Id. 
Grouse Creek observed that on November 5, 20 I 0, Idaho Power, Rocky Mountain 
Power and Avista filed a Joint Motion to Reduce the Published Rate Eligibility Cap. See 
generally Case No. GNR-E-10-04. In response, on November 8, 2010, the Grouse Creek 
projects each filed a complaint against Idaho Power for failing to negotiate in good faith. In 
these complaints, Grouse Creek alleged that Idaho Power had acted in bad faith by requiring 
completion of unnecessary interconnection processes and transmission requests and by refusing 
to enter into an agreement without a $45/kW delay liquidated damages security provision. Id. at 
13. Grouse Creek and Idaho Power subsequently settled the disputes asserted in the complaints 
and entered into the two PP As whose terms are at issue in this case. 
Following successful negotiations, on December 9, 20 I 0, Grouse Creek "requested 
through e-mail" that the "First Energy Date" and the "Commercial Online Date" in the PPA for 
both projects be amended and deferred until June 2013 and December 2013, respectively. Id. at 
14-15. On December 15, 2010, Idaho Power consented to the deferrals in the First Energy and 
Online Date. Id. at 15. Idaho Power forwarded the final PP As to Grouse Creek for signatures on 
December 16, 2010. Id. at 15-16. 
Grouse Creek argues that all material terms were well settled prior to December 14, 
2010, despite the projects' inability to obtain fully executed contracts until December 28, 2010. 
Id at 16. It is on this basis that Grouse Creek asserts a legally enforceable obligation was 
formed that entitles the projects to the published avoided cost rates contained in Order No. 
31025, and as reflected in their PP As. 
2. Commission Staff 
Staff maintains that the Commission's prior Orders relied only on the express terms 
of the Agreements between the projects and Idaho Power. Staff acknowledges the PURP A 
provisions for legally enforceable obligations. However, Staff argues that "the simple act of a 
QF requesting a PURPA contract from a utility cannot reasonably be interpreted as a 
commitment by the QF to sell electricity to the utility from which it requests a draft contract. 
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Something in furtherance of the QFs intent and ability to provide electricity is required." Staff 
Brief at 5. 
In considering whether and when a legally enforceable obligation was incurred, 
Commission Staff relied on the language in PURPA and the guidance of FERC in the Cedar 
Creek case. See Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory Order, 137 FERC ~ 61,006 (Oct. 4, 
2011 ). Staff asserts that a legally enforceable obligation was incurred no later than December 9, 
20 I 0 - the date upon which the projects modified their on-line dates. Staff Brief at 5. "At that 
time, QF projects with a design capacity of I 0 aMW and smaller were entitled to Idaho's 
published avoided cost rates. Consequently, Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind 
Park II are entitled to published avoided cost PURPA contracts at published rates that were in 
effect on December 9, 201 O." Id. at 6. 
3. Idaho Power Company 
Idaho Power maintains that it pursued good faith negotiations with Grouse Creek and 
that any delay was not attributable to a refusal by Idaho Power to negotiate or execute a contract. 
Idaho Power argues that any delay was the result of Grouse Creek's conduct. Idaho Power states 
that Grouse Creek changed the configuration of the project numerous times, did not agree to 
standard contract terms and conditions until December 9, 2010, did not provide final and 
complete infonnation regarding the projects' configuration until December 15, 2010, and did not 
commit itself to sell its output to Idaho Power until December 21, 2010. Idaho Power Brief at 
11. 
Idaho Power asserts that it forwarded updated draft PP As to the projects on December 
7, 2010, and notified Grouse Creek of missing information that was necessary for the Company 
to confirm the required one-mile separation between projects. On December 9, Grouse Creek 
agreed to the security provisions and requested a change in the Scheduled First Energy Date and 
Scheduled Operation Date for each Agreement. On December 14, 2010, Idaho Power maintains 
that it sent communications to Grouse Creek requesting that the projects provide missing 
necessary information to complete the draft PPAs.2 Grouse Creek confirmed the operation dates 
and the legal descriptions on December 15, 2010. Id at 11-12. 
1 Idaho Power maintains that the projects failed to name the transmission entity - the projects had indicated at 
different times that it would either be BPA or PacifiCorp. In addition, Idaho Power states that the projects failed to 
provide a complete location designation which is necessary to establish both compliance with the one-mile 
separation rule and provide a proper legal description of the projects' locations. 
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Idaho Power states that it provided Grouse Creek with executable copies of two PP As 
on December 15, 2010. Grouse Creek signed the Agreements on December 21, 2010, and 
returned the PP As to Idaho Power via overnight mail. Idaho Power reviewed the Agreements 
and signed on December 28, 2010. Id. The Agreements were filed with the Commission on 
December 29, 2010. Idaho Power argues that the facts of this case are distinguishable from the 
Cedar Creek case. Because Idaho Power did not refuse to enter into a contract with Grouse 
Creek, the projects' legally enforceable obligation is incurred on the date that they signed the 
PP As and obligated themselves to sell output to Idaho Power - on December 21, 2010. Based on 
these facts, Idaho Power concludes that Grouse Creek is not eligible for published rate contracts. 
Therefore, Idaho Power maintains that the Commission's decision not to approve the contracts 
should be affirmed. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over Idaho Power, an electric 
utility, and the issues raised in this matter pursuant to the authority and power granted it under 
Title 61 of the Idaho Code and PURPA. The Commission has authority under PURPA and the 
implementing regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to set avoided 
costs, to order electric utilities to enter into fixed-term obligations for the purchase of energy 
from qualified facilities (QFs) and to implement FERC rules. 
This Commission has been granted authority to implement PURPA and is the 
appropriate state forum to review contracts and resolve disputes between QFs and electric 
utilities. Idaho Code§§ 61-502, 61-503, A.W Brown v. Idaho Power Co .. 121 Idaho 812, 816, 
828 P.2d 841, 845 (1992); Empire Lumber Co. v. Washington Water Power Co, 114 Idaho 191, 
755 P.2d 1229 ( 1987). Moreover, the Commission has the authority to engage in case-by-case 
analysis in setting out its standards and requirements for implementation of PURPA. Power 
Resources Group v. PUC of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 237 (5th Cir. 2005) citing Policy Statement 
Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of [PURP A], 23 FERC ~ 
61,304, 1983 WL 39627 (May 31, 1983); Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 
917 P.2d 766 (1996). Jt is up to the States, not FERC, 
to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase 
agreements, including the date at which a legally enforceable obligation is 
incurred under State Jaw. Similarly, whether the particular facts applicable to 
an individual QF necessitate modifications of other terms and conditions of 
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the QF's contract with the purchasing utility 1s a matter for the States to 
determine. 
West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC ii 61,153 at 61,495 (1995). Accord: Jersey Central Power & 
Light Co., 73 FERC ~ 61,092 at 61,297-61,298 (1995); }vfetropolitan Edison Co., 72 FERC ~ 
61,015 at 61,050 ( 1995). FERC is not a forum for adjudicating the specific provisions of each 
individual QF contract. Id. The exercise of a State commission's discretion in the application of 
PURPA standards to particular contracts has Jong been recognized as outside the scope of 
FERC's enforcement authority. 3 
This case was remanded to the Commission from the Idaho Supreme Court based on 
the Stipulated Motion to Suspend the Appeal. The remand was intended to allow the 
Commission to consider the implication of FERC's Cedar Creek Declaratory Order on the 
specific facts of this case. Grouse Creek relies upon FERC's determination that this 
Commission's final Order - in the Cedar Creek case - limits "the creation of a legally 
enforceable obligation only to QFs that have [PP As] . . . signed by both parties to the 
agreement." Notice of Intent Not to Act and Declaratory Order, 13 7 FERC ~ 61,006 at ~ 26 
(Oct. 4, 2011). Based on this premise, FERC stated that the Commission's decision to not 
approve the Cedar Creek PPAs was inconsistent with PURPA and FERC's regulations 
implementing PURP A. Id. Grouse Creek extrapolates from FER C's Declaratory Order that the 
Commission's decision to not approve its two PP As is likewise inconsistent with PURPA and 
FER C's regulations implementing PURP A. 
At the outset, we note that this Commission did not and has never made a 
determination that the creation of a legally enforceable obligation only occurs when a QF and a 
utility enter into a vvTitten and signed agreement. In our prior Orders in this case, we found that 
Grouse Creek and Idaho Power entered into Agreements with one another that specifically stated 
the terms and conditions of the Agreements - including the effective date. We recognized and 
chose to enforce the terms of the Agreements that the parties entered into voluntarily. We 
specifically noted that "each Firm Energy Sales Agreement states that the 'Effective Date' of the 
Agreement is 'The date stated in the opening paragraph of this ... Agreement representing the 
3 Policy Statement Regarding the Commission's Enforcement Role Under Section 210 of the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 23 FERC ~ 61,304 at 61,645 (1983) (" ... the Commission's role is limited 
regarding questions of the proper application of these rules on a case-by-case basis"). See Power Resource Group, 
Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Comm 'n of Texas, 422 F.3d 231, 238 (5 1h Cir. 2005); Mass. Inst. Tech v. Mass. Dept. of Pub. 
Utils, 94 I F.Supp. 233, 236-237 (D. Mass. 1996). 
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date upon which this [Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties.' Agreements~ 1.11. The 
opening paragraph is dated 'this 28 day of December, 2010.' Agreements at 1 ." Order No. 
32257 at 9: Agreements ~i 5.1. We find that the Agreements were negotiated. agreed to and 
executed by both parties and clearly and unambiguously state that the effective date of the PP As 
is December 28, 2010. 
As we previously explained. ''FERC regulations grant the states latitude in 
implementing the regulation of sales and purchases between QFs and electric utilities." FERC v. 
Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982). According to FERC, "it is up 
to the States, not [FERC] to determine the specific parameters of individual QF power purchase 
agreements." Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 128 Idaho 609, 623, 5624, 917 P.2d 766, 781, 
782 ( 1996) citing West Penn Power Co., 71 FERC ~ 61, 153 ( 1995). This Commission 
determined that, by the clear and unambiguous terms of the Agreements themselves, the 
Agreements were not effective until December 28, 2010. Order No. 32299 at 7. Because the 
size of each Grouse Creek project exceeds 100 kW and each Agreement became effective after 
December 14, 2010, we found that the terms within the Agreements, i.e., published avoided cost 
rates, did not comply with Order No. 32176. Order No. 32257 at 9-1 O; Order No. 32299 at 7, 8-
10. Our findings in this respect are supported by substantial and competent evidence - the 
request by Idaho Power and Grouse Creek to approve its PP As and the unambiguous terms of the 
Agreements. We clearly did not make a finding that the creation of a legally enforceable 
obligation only occurs when a QF and a utility enter into a written and signed agreement. We 
found, based on the specific facts of the two Grouse Creek projects that the parties entered into 
Agreements that unequivocally state an effective date. We are simply recognizing the express 
terms of the executed Agreements. This finding is entirely consistent with Idaho law and the 
authority granted to us by PURPA and FERC. 
It is also important to note that a declaratory order issued by FERC is not legally 
binding on this Commission. A declaratory order "that does no more than announce the 
[FERC's] interpretation of the PURPA or one of the agency's implementing regulations is of no 
legal moment unless and until a district court adopts that interpretation when called upon to 
enforce the PURPA." Niagara 1Hohawk Power Corp .. v. FERC, 117 F.3d 1485, 1488, 326 
U.S.App.D.C. 135, 138 (1997). 
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Unlike the declaratory order of a court, which does fix the rights of the parties, 
this [FERC] Declaratory Order merely advised the parties of the [FERC's] 
position. It was much like a memorandum of law prepared by the FERC staff 
in anticipation of a possible enforcement action; the only difference is that the 
[FERC] itself formally used the document as its own statement of position. 
While such knowledge of the FERC' s position might affect the conduct of the 
parties, the Declaratory Order is legally ineffectual apart from its ability to 
persuade (or to command the deference of) a [district] court that might later 
have been called upon to interpret the Act and the agency's regulations in an 
[sic] private enforcement action .... " 
Industrial Cogenerators v. FERC, 47 F.3d 1231, 1235 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
In the matter before us, Grouse Creek relies on a FERC Declaratory Order, issued as 
the result of an enforcement petition filed with FERC by an entirely separate QF project - Cedar 
Creek. After the Declaratory Order was issued, the parties to the Cedar Creek case returned to 
this Commission with terms of a stipulated settlement and requested its approval. Based on the 
specific facts of the Cedar Creek case and the settlement proposal, we approved the settlement. 
Order No. 32419. The Grouse Creek projects are distinct in many ways. Grouse Creek has not 
petitioned FERC for an enforcement order, Grouse Creek has been unable to negotiate a 
settlement agreeable to all parties, and Grouse Creek is relying on a FERC Declaratory Order 
that is not binding on this Commission. In addition, Grouse Creek did not sign its PP As until 
December 20, 20 I 0 - after the change in eligibility on December 14. Agreements at p. 33. 
Furthermore, the language of FERC's Declaratory Order leads us to doubt whether FERC 
understood the basis upon which this Commission made its initial decision to disapprove the 
Agreements. 
The Idaho Commission has aggressively and proactively enforced PURP A, as 
evidenced by the abundance of QF projects that now operate in our State. We have a long 
history of recognizing two methods by which a QF can obtain an avoided cost rate in Idaho: (1) 
by entering into a signed contract with the utility; or (2) by filing a meritorious complaint 
alleging that "a legally enforceable obligation" has arisen and, but for the conduct of the utility, 
there would be a contract. Rosebud Enterprises v. Idaho PUC, 131 Idaho I, 951 P.2d 521 
(1997); see alsoA.W Brown v. Idaho Power Company, 121 Idaho 812, 816, 828 P.2d 841, 845 
(1992). Our application of this framework conforms with FERC's analysis of its standards. In 
JD Wind 1, FERC succinctly stated, 
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Thus, under our regulations, a QF has the option to commit itself to sell all or 
part of its electric output to an electric utility. While this may be done through 
a contract, if the electric utility refuses to sign a contract, the QF may seek 
state regulatory authority assistance to enforce the PURPA-imposed 
obligation on the electric utility to purchase from the QF, and a non-
contractua!, but still legally enforceable, obligation will be created pursuant 
to rhe state's implementation of PURPA. Accordingly, a QF, by committing 
itself to sell to an electric utility, also commits the electric utility to buy from 
the QF; these commitments result either in contracts or in non-contractual. 
but binding, legally enforceable obligations. 
JD Wind 1, 129 FERC il 61,148 at 61,633 (Nov. 19, 2009) (emphases added). FERC determined 
that, regardless of whether the energy offered was firm or non-firm power, the QF was entitled to 
a legally enforceable obligation because the utility in JD Wind was refusing to enter into a 
contract with the QF. FERC reiterated its conclusions on reconsideration. JD Wind 1, 130 
FERC ~ 61, 127 at 61,628. The matter before this Commission involves two parties who 
voluntarily entered into PPAs with negotiated terms and conditions. 
Idaho's framework for determining whether and when a QF can obtain an avoided 
cost rate is entirely consistent with the federal standards as set out by FERC. Either the parties 
enter into a contract or, if the utility is failing to negotiate or refusing to enter into a contract with 
a QF, the QF can file a complaint with this Commission, at which time the Commission will 
make a determination as to whether and when a legally enforceable obligation arose. In this 
case, the parties negotiated and executed two Agreements. On December 29, 2010, the parties 
submitted their PPAs to the Commission for approval. A determination regarding whether and 
when a legally enforceable obligation arose - outside the specific contract terms was wholly 
unnecessary. The Agreements submitted to the Commission for approval included all of the 
terms and conditions negotiated and agreed to by the parties - including the effective date of the 
Agreements. 
It would be unreasonable and arbitrary for us to supplant the agreed upon terms of a 
negotiated and signed contract with additional terms and/or conditions without a compelling 
reason. Moreover, Grouse Creek urged the Commission to approve the Agreements as 
submitted. When a contract has been entered into by the parties and submitted for approval, 
there is no need for a determination regarding any other legally enforceable obligation. FERC 
refers to a legally enforceable obligation in the disjunctive - either a contract is entered into OR 
a legally enforceable obligation is created. With regard to the subject PPAs between Idaho 
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Power and Grouse Creek, the legally enforceable obligations of the parties arc contained within 
the four comers of the Agreements. 
More importantly, Section 29.1 of each Agreement states that "[t]his Agreement 
constitutes the entire Agreement of the Parties concerning the subject matter hereof and 
supersedes all prior or contemporaneous oral or written agreements between the Parties 
concerning the subject matter hereof." Agreements ~I 29.1 (emphasis added). This integration 
clause4 is consistent with the general rule that "when a contract has been reduced to writing, 
which the parties intend to be a complete statement of their agreement, any other written or oral 
agreements or understandings ... made prior to or contemporaneously with the written 'contract' 
and which relate to the same subject matter are not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the 
terms of the written contract." Chapman v. Haney Seed Co., Inc, I 02 Idaho 26, 28, 624 P.2d 
408, 410 ( 1981 ). Thus, Grouse Creek accepted that, by entering into the PP As, all prior 
agreements would be replaced by the terms of the written and signed PP As - including any 
agreement or understanding as to a prior legally enforceable obligation. Section 29.1 functions 
as an acknowledgement by the parties that the terms of the written Agreements supersede all 
prior oral or written agreements between the parties. Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 644-
645, 249 P.3d 829, 837-838 (2011); Silver Syndicate v. Sunshine Mining Co., 101 Idaho 226, 
235, 611P.2d1011, 1020 (1979). 
Grouse Creek's arguments on remand rely on the FERC Declaratory Order as support 
that Grouse Creek perfected a legally enforceable obligation "no later than November 8, 201 O" 
(the date that Grouse Creek filed complaints against Idaho Power) or alternatively, it established 
a legally enforceable obligation "at the very latest on December 9, 2010." Brief at 3. In either 
case, Grouse Creek asserts that it formed a legally enforceable obligation prior to December 14, 
2010- the date that the eligibility cap for published avoided cost rates decreased to 100 kW. Id. 
at 2. Even assuming, arguendo, that a legally enforceable obligation could somehow preempt 
the terms of subsequently written and signed Agreements between the parties, we find that a 
legally enforceable obligation did not exist prior to December 14, 2010. 
Turning first to the November 8 date, we find this claim unsupported by the evidence 
for two reasons. First, we acknowledge that Grouse Creek filed a complaint on November 8, 
4 In Primary Health Network v. Idaho Dept. of Administration, the integration clause stated that "the Agreement 
supersedes all prior and contemporaneous arrangements, understandings, negotiations and discussion." 137 Idaho 
663, 668 n.2, 52 P.3d 307 312 n.2 (2002). 
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2010 - just three days after the Joint Motion to Reduce the Published Rate Eligibility Cap was 
filed by the utilities. However, Grouse Creek subsequently requested that the Commission not 
serve a summons on Idaho Power because the parties were negotiating and had tentatively 
reached a settlement. Indeed, a summons was never issued and the parties filed two PPAs for 
approval with this Commission six weeks later. The complaint process did not need to be 
initiated because the parties were actively negotiating terms of their Agreements. Grouse Creek 
also urged the Commission in its written comments in the PP A cases to approve the PP As - it 
did not pursue the complaints. Comments at 24. Second, the parties subsequently negotiated 
and executed PPAs that specifically included language about the written Agreements 
superseding all prior agreements. See supra pp. 13-14. Based on these facts, we cannot find that 
a legally enforceable obligation arose on or by November 8, 2010. 
The utility did not refuse to sign a contract. In fact, ongoing negotiations led to the 
parties' voluntarily entering into two subsequent PPAs. Grouse Creek never initiated a 
complaint process because Agreements were negotiated and Grouse Creek urged the 
Commission to approve the terms of the Agreements. We find that no conduct by the utility 
unnecessarily delayed or impeded Grouse Creek's ability to enter into its Agreements. Because 
the utility did not impede Grouse Creek's ability to enter into PP As, a determination regarding a 
legally enforceable obligation was never triggered. This Commission did not substitute a ''fully 
executed contract" standard in place of a "legally enforceable obligation," nor did we require a 
fully executed contract as a condition precedent to the creation of a legally enforceable 
obligation. We simply acknowledged the distinction between the concepts and looked to the 
terms of the unambiguous Agreements signed by both parties and submitted to the Commission 
for approval. Grouse Creek cannot now argue against terms that are included in its contracts 
simply because those terms do not provide it with a favorable outcome. 
We also find that the evidence and the conduct of the parties do not support that a 
legally enforceable obligation was formed no later than December 9, 2010. First, on December 
9, 2010, Grouse Creek requested that the PPAs be amended to delay the two operational dates by 
six months. Brief at 14-15. In addition, Idaho Power notes that it requested information on both 
December 7 and December 14, 2010, and notified Grouse Creek that the projects failed to 
provide a complete location designation which is necessary to establish both compliance with the 
one-mile separation rule and provide a proper legal description of the projects' locations. Idaho 
ORDER NO. 32635 15 
Power also maintains that the projects failed to name the transmission entity - Grouse Creek had 
indicated at different times that it would either be BPA or PacifiCorp. Grouse Creek confirmed 
the operation dates and the legal descriptions on December 15, 2010 - a day after the eligibility 
cap was reduced. Id. at 11-12. Idaho Power formally agreed to the delay on December 16, 20 I 0. 
/d.atl5. 
After receiving the final material terms, Idaho Power forwarded executable PPAs to 
Grouse Creek for signature on December 16, 20 I 0. Brief at 15-16. Grouse Creek reviewed the 
documents and signed the PP As four days later - on December 20, 20 I 0. 5 Idaho Power 
reviewed the documents and signed on December 28, 2010. Consequently, we find that 
negotiations were on-going and that material terms to the Agreements were still in flux on and 
after December 14, 2010 - the date upon which eligibility to published avoided cost rates 
became effective. Therefore, assuming that a determination regarding when a legally enforceable 
obligation arose is necessary, we find that a legally enforceable obligation did not arise prior to 
December 14, 2010, because material terms to the Agreements were still incomplete on that date. 
Finally, this Commission determined that it was not in the public interest to approve 
the Agreements. Specifically, we found that "allowing a project to avail itself of an eligibility 
cap (and therefore published rates) that is no longer applicable could cause ratepayers to pay 
more than the utility's avoided cost." Order No. 32299 at 8. For this Commission to approve a 
rate in excess of the utility's avoided cost would clearly be a violation of PURPA and FERC's 
implementing regulations. A. W. Brown, 121Idaho812, 818, 828 P.2d 841, 847 (1992). 
We find that Idaho Power and Grouse Creek were in the process of actively 
negotiating terms of two PPAs when the eligibility for published avoided cost rates changed. 
The parties entered into their contracts on December 28, 2010. By the express terms of the 
Agreements negotiated and signed by the parties, the Agreements' ''effective date" is December 
28, 2010 - the "date stated in the opening paragraph of this [Agreement] representing the date 
upon which this [Agreement] was fully executed by both Parties.'' Agreements~ 1.11. Because 
the parties have existing contracts, and we find no undue or unreasonable delay on the part of 
Idaho Power, a determination of the existence of a legally enforceable obligation at another point 
in time is unnecessary. Moreover, the parties agreed that all prior agreements were superseded 
5 The affidavit and comments both state that the PP As were signed on December 21, 20 l 0, but the PP As themselves 
show the date as December 20, 20 l 0. 
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by the December 28, 20 l 0 PP As. Here the Commission did not have to determine whether a 
legally enforceable obligation arose because the parties entered into written Agreements. 
Therefore, we affirm our prior decision that, because each PPA became effective on December 
28, 2010, and each project is larger than 100 kW, published rates are not available to the 
projects.6 We also find that the Agreements expressly supersede all prior agreements, including 
any entitlement to an otherwise enforceable legal obligation. The rates in the Agreements, as 
written, do not comply with Commission Order No. 32176. These findings are consistent with 
the expressed intent and spirit of PURPA and the FERC regulations. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Power Purchase Agreements between Idaho 
Power and Grouse Creek Wind Park and Grouse Creek Wind Park II are not approved because 
the rates included in the Agreements were no longer available at the time the Agreements were 
executed and became effective. 
THIS IS A FINAL RECONSIDERATION ORDER ON REMAND. Any party 
aggrieved by this Order may appeal to the Supreme Court of Idaho as provided by the Public 
Utilities Law and the Idaho Appellate Rules. See Idaho Code§ 61-627. 
6 The same reasoning wou Id apply if we were to use the date (December 20, 20 I 0) that Grouse Creek signed the 
Agreement. 
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-r-rh 
DONE by Order of the Idaho Public Utilities Commission at Boise, Idaho this I 
day of September 2012. 
ATTEST: 
Jtan D. Jewell f 
Commission S~cretary 
0: IPC-E-10-61_IPC-E-I0-62_ks7 
ORDER NO. 32635 
/] 
(/itdct 
MACK A. REDFO 
~d~ 
MARSHA H. SMITH, COMMISSIONER 
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Monday, November 29, 2010 10:51 AM 
Xan Allen 
RECE 




Could you please include this email in the record for the IPC+l0-29 and 10-30 case? Thank you. 
Kris 
From: Peter Richardson fmailto:peter@richardsonandolearv.com] 
Sent: Monday, November 29, 2010 10:46 AM 
To: Kris Sasser 
Cc: Walker, Donovan; Greg Adams; Allphin, Randy 
Subject: Grouse Creek Complaint Dockets 
Kris, as we discussed this morning on the telephone, we have tentatively reached a settlement with 
Idaho Power and respectfully request that the Commission not serve a summons on Idaho Power at this 
time. We believe we will have a final settlement within approximately two to three weeks and we will 
at that time formally request a dismissal that would be contingent upon Commission approval of the 
final settlement agreement and power purc;hase agreement. Please reference Docket Nos. IPC-E-10-29 
and IPC-E-10-30. 
Peter Richardson 
Richardson & O'Leary 
515 N. 27th Street 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
(208) 938-7901 
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